Work, leisure, nature and culture, all previously dispersed, separate and more or less irreducible activities that produced anxiety and complexity in our real life . . . have finally become mixed, massaged, climate-controlled, and domesticated into the simple activity of perpetual shopping. (Baudrillard, 1988: 34) Gramscian thought and the concept of hegemony have brought to the fore the issues of consent formation, coercion, and the blurred demarcation between these seeming opposites. Hegemony theory is a prominent vehicle for analyzing the processes that yield this kind of cloudedness. The notion of hegemony assumes an 'unequal exchange between the cultures and ideologies of dominant and subordinate social groups and classes' (Bennett, 1982: 15) . One aspect of such social hegemony is a dominant ideology, which does not have an essential class character, single and permanent, for all time. Rather, it acquires a class character only in the light of the ways in which it is used, put into motion, and grafted onto other ideologies in the context of specific class strategies for hegemony (Bennett, 1982: 15-19) . Against this background, powerful and morally leading groups are able to set limits on circulating ideologies (Gitlin, 1980) . Such groups influence the conditions and social climate in which people make presumably autonomous decisions, even seemingly personal ones (Mouffe, 1979) . Traditionally, these groups were considered in strict terms of social class. Today, however, additional social characteristics, such as gender, race, or religion, are all recognized as potentially significant in their influence on individuals' desires and public perceptions (Condit, 1994) . This perspective harbors a challenge to the concept of agency and to the idea of autonomy implied in it. Individuals' and groups' presumed agency may be revealed as pretence, lip service rather than a real option of alternatives. The hegemony perspective also prevails in body-related analyses. In this context, the emphasis is on the footprints of the ruling classes on the articulation of bodily ideals and practices as well as on their diffusion into various social classes (e.g. Fields, 1999; Olgin, 1997; Toombs, 1997) . The media plays an important part in the process, usually by enhancing images that reinforce hegemonic notions of race, class and gender (Game, 1998) .
In this article we examine a setting that offers a particular vantage point for studying the relevance of hegemony to the choice of a sperm donor made by Israeli recipients of donor insemination (DI). This choice emerges in a world in which the presumably natural becomes objectified, commodified, subject to the rules and images of mass consumption. Following a general and contextual introduction, we present recipients' choices, which reveal a convergence on a specific type of physiognomy. The relative homogeneity of the preferences is analyzed within the
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context of what may be called democratized DI and the theoretical framework of social hegemony. The article is based on data retrieved from a major Israeli sperm bank located on the outskirts of Tel Aviv.
Until recent years, DI was highly secretive in all western countries. Recipients were excluded from the donor-matching process, which doctors carried out by themselves; relatives and acquaintances, as well as the resulting children were not informed of the treatment; no documentation was compiled, in order to avoid unintended disclosure (Nachtigall, 1993) . Doctors assumed that recipients, who by and large were married couples, wished to 'duplicate' the male partner and matched donors accordingly. (For Israel, see Carmeli and BirenbaumCarmeli, 2000.) In the last few years, the concealment strategy has gradually been moderated in several countries, owing to contextual transformations: growing awareness of DI-related risks, notably the transmission of HIV; increased weight placed on genetic origin; and a pluralization of family structures. Generally speaking, the trend is towards greater openness in DI, somewhat inspired by the adoption model. Additionally, with the growing recognition of the extra-medical elements present in the treatment, recipients are increasingly incorporated into the donor-matching process, thus giving place to a more democratized, commodified version of DI (Brewaeys et al., 1993; Daniels, 1994; Nachtigall, 1993; Verny, 1994) .
In this spirit, sperm banks have introduced more liberal policies, offering 'a personal donor' program (in which the donor is provided by the recipient (Adair and Purdie, 1996) , and at times disclosure of identities to mature children (e.g. the Xytex Corporation in Georgia; the Berkeley Sperm Bank in California). In 1985, Sweden formally legalized children's right to meet the donor when they reach 18 years of age (Daniels, 1994; Landau, 1996; Lui et al., 1995; Pedersen et al., 1994; Purdie et al., 1992) . Britain, Australia, and New Zealand are also developing more open DI policies (Cooke, 1993; Daniels and Taylor, 1993) . Whereas pioneering clinics provide detailed information about the donor (which may include a personal statement and a photograph), the provision of basic donor-related information has become standard practice. Under these circumstances, DI recipients are granted an unprecedented ability to modify the procreative process by making choices that would influence its outcome.
Making choices is central in present-day western culture. In the spirit of the liberal tradition, the right and ability to make choices is fundamental to the making of the modern subject. Through their choices, people define themselves in such domains as lifestyle, social hierarchy, and social identity (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984) . In the context of DI, one implication is the transfer of a child's visage and talents from the limitations and givenness of the parents' bodily nature to the spheres of choice, commodification and consumption. Basic physiological traits (height, skin color, eye color) as well as mental capacities all become negotiable. 1 In her innovative analysis of procreative technologies, Strathern (1992) depicts choice as highly problematic yet immanent to current developments in the field. Broadly speaking, choice is associated in western thought with culture, whereas procreation conjures up nature. The associations are so tight that the procreation/choice dichotomy may be taken as synonyms for the historically constructed primordiality of the nature/culture split. The convergence of procreation and choice through technology thus challenges a basic epistemological dichotomy and, as such, harbors far-reaching cosmological implications. The erosion of nature's status as taken for granted is one major consequence:
Artificial processes are seen to substitute for natural ones, and thus present themselves as 'interfering with nature'. What is interfered with is the very idea of a natural fact. Or, to put it another way, of the difference between natural and cultural ones . . . When the concept is that Nature cannot survive without cultural intervention, the conceptual differences between nature and culture collapse . . . Nature as a ground for the meaning of cultural practices can no longer be taken for granted if Nature itself is regarded as having to be protected and promoted. (Strathern, 1992: 43, 174, 177) This perspective, which emphasizes procreative choice as a source of ontological crisis, may be contrasted with an approach that became popular in consumption studies (e.g. Friedman, 1994; Miller, 1995) . According to this latter, somewhat more 'optimistic' view, choice, and consumption as its epitome -even if conducted within the limitations of a hegemonized context -becomes 'the privileged site of autonomy, meaning, subjectivity, privacy and freedom' (Slater, 1997: 31) .
When applied to the body, choice is implied in the postmodern constitution of the body as a project to be accomplished, an object to be displayed (Featherstone, 1991: 187; Shilling, 1999) . A leitmotif in this context is beauty and its significance as a social resource. Research shows that children perceived as physically attractive are favored from an early age by teachers and friends. In later years, good-looking people receive more social reinforcement and help from others, they elicit greater compliance and self-disclosure, are more in demand in the labor market, and are evaluated more positively (Cash, 1990: 54-6; Etcoff, 2000: 56, 86) . Other studies show attractive people to be more confident, more socially skilled, and less prone to psychological disorder than their homelier counterparts (Archer and Cash, 1985; Cash, 1990: 57-9; Fisher, 1986: 127) . Morally, too, the prevalence of the idea that 'What is beautiful is good' has repeatedly been confirmed (Dion et al., 1982; Cash, 1990: 53) . Moreover, the importance of one's appearance seems to be increasing (Etcoff, 2000: 22) .
Beauty and more generally, the consumption of human images, are however, carried out within cultural-political contexts. As a system of signs, physiognomy conjures up social, ethnic, and class significances (Bordo, 1993; Grogan, 1999: 117-65) . Viewed from the hegemony perspective, human desiderata, the politics of choice, and the choice of physiological features -beauty included -are all constructed in a way that promotes the interests of the ruling classes. This technology of power, which entails a demeaning of the alternatives, naturalizes and thus legitimizes existing hegemony, rendering it self-evident, anchored in nature and hence unchangeable (Mills, 1997; Skelton, 1993) . All these trends may account for the preferences of DI recipients/consumers in regard to a sperm donor. Our findings suggest that recipients shape a child's appearance in the light of their own aspirations and ideal body-image, both heavily modified by consumer culture.
This brings us again to the complexity of 'nature's crisis.' On the one hand, the choice of a donor on the basis of his body image -i.e. procreative choice and commodification -challenges the constructed ontological security and the taken-for-granted stance of nature, as iterated by Strathern. Thus eroded, the naturalization of hegemony is severely impaired if anyone can choose the dominant appearance. On the other hand, nature is 'resurrected' as a commodity in the making of individual bodies and in the embodiment of collective identities. The choice of the 'appropriate' look reproduces -on the cosmological societal level -the validity of the natural metaphor and reaffirms the naturalized hegemony of dominant groups. This is as true of relations among different strata within a social system (the possible emergence of a donor of a locally desired image), as it is at the level of the global system (i.e. western hegemony as projected onto and naturalized via the desirability of the dominant western-type look).
The choice of a donor offers a singular vantage point for studying the interface between consumer culture and the making of postmodern individual and collective bodies (Featherstone, 1990; Monaghan, 1999) . In our study we approach these questions by looking at recipients' choices: to what extent do the choices reproduce an existing, naturalized hegemony of particular groups and to what extent is this hegemony local or globalized? The challenge to 'nature' through choice is a matter of degree, its meanings vary and its implications may appear in various dimensions. Jewish Israelis, living in a mixed arena where traditional practices coexist alongside liberal rational orientations, and where 'ethnic' categories prevail among immigrants, constitute an intriguing population for the study of these questions.
THE ISRAELI SETTING: HETEROGENEITY, FAMILISM AND PROCREATION
Israel's heterogeneous population is primarily split between Arabs and Jews, with Jews comprising some 80 per cent of the country's population. The Jews themselves are divided by ethnicity into the two major categories of Ashkenazi (of Euro-American origin) and Orientals (of AfroAsian origin). 2 Ashkenazi Jews, who were the majority of the state's founders, managed to materialize their priority into prolonged hegemony. Since their immigration to the region in the late 19th and early 20th centuries they have generally been more powerful than the Orientals (Smooha, 1998) . To judge by their political power, income, and education level, these power relations, although changing somewhat, are essentially retained. 3 This social hierarchy is embodied in the European looks of senior officials and businessmen occupying power positions, starring in the Israeli media, as well as in varied advertisements. The media image of 'the (Jewish) Israeli' (which already prevailed in Israeli cinema in the 1940s; Shohat, 1991) , is that of a young, sun-tanned, tall man, with light brown hair and light colored eyes (Weiss, forthcoming) . This local ideal, may be traced back to the Zionist ideology, which articulated the sound, athletic image of the Tsabar 4 as a symbol of collective renewal as well as a dissociation from Jewish Diaspora life of the past (Weiss, forthcoming) . This process took place in the pre-state period, when the Jewish population of the area consisted almost entirely of Ashkenazi immigrants. Oriental images were then associated, by and large, with the then recently constituted Other -the Arab. In the following decades, this preference was reinforced by the global glorification of Europeanlooking men, which rendered this image even more desirable (Lewis, 1996) . Later on, due to changes in the inter-ethnic power relations between Jewish groups, Oriental features were incorporated into the Israeli ideal.
In this mixed arena, beyond all differences of ethnicity, education, or class, Jewish Israelis are highly familistic (Hazlton, 1977) . Whether owing to their religious tradition, or to more contemporary reasons, the family is of utmost significance in Israel. From the religious perspective, as a part of the communal quest for survival, Jews placed supreme significance on the family and procreation. The biblical command 'Be fruitful and multiply,' was depicted as a major moral behest and a goal in one's life (Gold, 1988: 23) . Collective strategies of survival were rooted in the familial body, rendering reproduction a collective mission (e.g. Gold, 1988: 27; Safir, 1991; Shokeid, 1974) . In this sphere, the political converged with the private, under the equation of community with individual survival (Katz, 1971: 29; Swirski, 1976: 129-30) .
In more recent years, pronatalism may be traced to the pre-state period, when enlarging the Jewish population of the region was constituted as a contribution to the nation-building effort (Shuval, 1992: 66) . Families with many children were called 'blessed' and won, in addition to financial subsidies, national awards for their 'contribution to the national quest.' Later on, Holocaust survivors wished, and were encouraged, to establish families in response to the Nazi devastation. In the early 1950s, following the establishment of the State of Israel, the mass immigration to the newly established state consisted mainly of newcomers from traditional African/Asian countries. For them, too, one's family was a primary source of meaning in life (Davids, 1983; Hartman, 1984; Schiff, 1978) .
Today, despite some erosion of the traditional family, a comparison of Israelis to their North American and West European counterparts shows that more Israelis marry, and do so at an earlier age; they have more children (about one child more than in most West European countries) and fewer births out of wedlock. They also divorce less frequently (Fogiel-Bijaoui, 1999; Friedlander and Feldmann, 1993; Peres and Katz, 1991) . On the state level, pronatalist policy is still prominent. Universal birth endowment and child support up to 18 years of age starts from the first child and rises significantly with the fourth child. Paid maternity leave has been compulsory for decades, and day-care centers are subsidized by the state. Abortion, which is fairly accessible, requires, nevertheless, an approval of a special committee of social workers, religious representatives and physicians, who label the woman 'a reproductive deviant' (Amir and Biniamin, 1991) . In daily life, establishing a family is constructed as the 'normal' accomplishment of mature adulthood, and singles are pressured to 'marry and become a human being [a ben-adam, a mensch]'. Familial terms, like 'the patriarchs and the matriarchs [ha'avot veha'imahot]' or 'the children of Israel [bnei Israel]', are common idioms in daily parlance.
Both tradition and contemporary notions of parenthood reverberate in the pain and shame that infertility entails. Pressures toward establishing one's own family are reflected, among other things, in the scope of fertility treatments: Israel has the world's greatest number of in-vitro fertilization clinics per capita, and the state fully covers universal stateof-the-art treatment of the infertile to women of all ages, until they have two children (Landau, 1996; Solomon, 1991) . This policy extends to singles, as well, among whom DI is a popular mode of conception (Landau, 1996) .
In this context, paternity has a significance of its own. Though Jews trace their religious affiliation through the mother, one's family line is based on the father. In biblical texts and prayers, a child is referred to as 'the son of his father'. Contemporary Israeli male images, still saturated as they are with macho figures stemming from the local ethos of wars, supplement this centrality. By the same token, male infertility is considered a major calamity, and DI highly stigmatizing. Indeed, as in many other places, Israeli women often choose to present the fertility problem as theirs in order to conceal their partners' impairment.
DI has officially been practiced in Israel since 1979. Today, 16 sperm banks operate in Israeli hospitals; they differ in volume of activity, from 200 couples per year to sporadic service. Like all fertility treatments, DI is included in the 'service basket' provided free (or nearly free) of charge to every Israeli citizen. 5 The only component paid for by the recipient is the sperm sample itself, which costs some $80 per sample, an affordable sum for most Israelis. DI is open to any woman, irrespective of marital status or sexual preference. Since it started operating in 1996, the sperm bank described in this article has served about 600 women and couples.
Generally speaking, DI is heavily curtained in Israel. In the State Regulations of DI, published by the Ministry of Health in 1992, 6 the treatment was constituted as a cover-up for male infertility, camouflaging a technologically assisted family as a 'natural' one. The State Regulations prescribed donor-matching as the exclusive responsibility of the attending gynecologist and explicitly require the elimination of the recipients from the process. This dictate is observed in most Israeli sperm banks.
The sperm bank studied here is different. This relatively new facility allows recipients to choose the donor from a list, compiled personally for them by the professionals. Recipients are thus faced by a choice, constituted as consumers expressing their preferences. The choice presented to them, though, is not unrestricted. An examination of the entire donor population at the sperm bank revealed a physiognomic variation that is much smaller than that which exists on the heterogeneous Israeli scene. It may be suggested that the relative homogeneity in this bank has to do with the important role that its professionals' own social views play in the selection process. Although not required by the State Regulations, the local doctor prepares the shortlist offered to married women on the basis of the couple's blood types. This list is often further shortened according to the professionals' idea of the 'right' donor for the specific recipients. The donors, identified by number, are described by their height, weight, eye color, hair color, type of hair (straight, wavy, curly), body structure (slim, athletic, full), ethnic origin, religion, and field of study. The list is anonymous, and recipients accept, in a consent form that they sign, the dictate that no identifying information will be provided either to them or to the resulting children.
As stated earlier, we look at recipients'/consumers' preferences in order to trace hegemonic aspects and their naturalization in the context of choices made in the presumably most private sphere of DI. Owing to the sensitivity of the subject and the bank's policy of secrecy, we could not obtain any further socio-demographic information regarding the recipient population beyond the demarcation between married and single recipients.
In the following tables we present the profiles of the bank's donors by descending popularity (i.e. the higher a donor is listed in the table, the more often he was chosen). 7 We then provide the ratio between the married and single recipients who chose a specific donor. The division between married and single recipients was made, as women in each category carry out their choices within different spaces of consumer considerations. While there are relatively few donors, the number of women and couples seeking donation is considerably larger. Often, several treatment cycles are required in order to obtain pregnancy and the clinic's success rate was roughly 1:4. 8 The single to married ratio was roughly 1.6:1. According to the bank manager's general description, the recipient population was ethnically and educationally mixed. Table 1 lists all the clinic's donors by their overall popularity. Table 1 reveals that the 'inventory' of socio-physiognomic images that is provisioned by the sperm bank is relatively limited. All the donors were either students or soldiers. The soldiers were men aged 18-21 who served their compulsory military service. In Israeli terms, their status thus conjured up young age and not a profession. Indeed, in the particular clinic that we studied, the donors were all high-school graduates, thus the soldiers, too, were potential students in the future. Ethnically, Ashkenazi men were clearly overrepresented. (The national Ashkenazi: Oriental proportion is roughly 1:1.) Additionally, at an average height of 178.2 cm, the donors were taller than the average Israeli man whose height is 174.7 cm. The relative homogeneity of the donors/images is a result of two main factors. First, the gatekeeping professionals make these men their main target audience. They therefore approach them more than any others. On their part, these men are more likely to respond favorably to the clinic's invitation. Later on, it is the professionals again, who tend to select these men as donors.
A look at the demand side, i.e. at the recipients'/consumers' choices, reveals interesting differences between the choices performed by single, as opposed to married recipients. Tables 2 and 3 show that married recipients selected donors who were somewhat shorter, swarthier and of more mixed ethnic origins than the ones chosen by their single counterparts. This tendency may be illustrated by the demand structure for the most popular donors/images, among whom ethnically mixed donors were overrepresented. The two most popular donors among the married recipients were of ethnically mixed origins and had a presumably ambiguous appearance. The first one was brown eyed and fair skinned, while the second had hazel Also of interest was the demand for the visibly short donor who shared the second place in popularity among the married recipients (listed as number 4 in Table 3 ). According to the bank's manager, this man was one of the clinic's first donors and was personally favored and actively 'promoted' by the staff. Additionally, although listed as 'soldier', he had previously graduated from a prestigious academic institute, and the staff members made this fact known to the recipients. Nevertheless, despite his academic accomplishments and the staff's recommendation, this donor was popular among married recipients (rather than singles, who had no commitment towards a husband's physiognomy).
We interpret these choices made by married recipients in terms of their wish to reconcile the desire for good-looking children (as currently perceived in consumer culture) with the quest for a 'natural family' appearance. In this respect, the male partners' socio-physiological features set 'limits' (Hirsch, 1995) on the couples' choices. This reading is supported by a previous study of Israeli DI recipients (BirenbaumCarmeli et al., 2000) , which revealed that most of the married DI recipients/consumers tried to put on an appearance of a 'natural family' and kept the treatment as a secret. 11 Moreover, when asked, in our questionnaires, for their hypothetical preferences, the recipients expressed a willingness to somewhat deviate from the male partner's features (Birenbaum-Carmeli and Carmeli, forthcoming), but to an extent that would remain within the limits of 'natural family' resemblance.
As for the single recipients, Table 3 shows their desired image as that of a fair-skinned, tall (1.83 m) man, with light brown hair, and blue/green eyes. In local terms, this image embodies an 'attractive Ashkenazi'. It is worth noting that the singles' choices were more homogeneous (in height, weight, ethnic origin) than these of their married counterparts. Applying the 'natural family' logic, the homogeneity may be attributed to the singles' freedom to choose the image, which is apparently dominant, in a fairly unrestricted manner.
Education was another aspect of some difference between married and single recipients. Whereas the popular donors among married recipients were all soldiers, among the singles, three of the most popular donors were of proven academic abilities as students in prestigious fields. Here again, it may be suggested that less educated married couples shunned away from highly educated donors, while single recipients were freer to choose better-educated donors.
A point of convergence between the preferences of the two categories was the donors' BMI (Body mass index). Interestingly, the average BMI of the popular donors in the two categories of recipients were practically identical. In other words, while married recipients compromised the donor's height and skin color, they did prefer him to have the socially desirable proportion. A reference to the national figures is illuminating: the average BMI for Jewish Israeli men is 26.39 (SD=4.11) and the respective figure for men aged 25-35 is 25.17 (SD=4.02). The popular donors, whose average BMI was roughly 22.3 (SD=1.7) were thus significantly slimmer than the average Israeli Jewish man.
A donor who requires particular attention is one not mentioned in either shortlists (i.e. Tables 2 and 3), the donor described in 11th place in Table 1 . Interestingly, this tall man (195 cm) was not in great demand in either category. In the singles' group, among whom he was 12th in popularity, his relative unpopularity may be explained by the exceptionality of his height. Apparently the image of tallness is desirable only up to a certain point, beyond which it becomes an impediment. Thus, single women, who could feature their children to have the 'optimal' looks, avoided the exceedingly tall donor. As for the married recipients, given their discrete attitude towards DI and the 'natural family' appearance they assume, and given the rarity of such tall men in Israel, married recipients/consumers were reluctant to choose a donor visibly taller than the male partner. However, when the male partner was tall, couples did choose this specific donor image, as shown by this tall donor's relatively higher popularity among married recipients. (Given the 1.6:1 single: married ratio in the clinic, the figure of 0.9:1 represents a significant overrepresentation of married recipients.)
DISCUSSION
The objective of our study of the popularity of various donor images among Jewish Israeli DI recipients is to examine the impact of social hegemony to this reality, which has been hitherto considered highly personal and private. The data show that both the health professionals and the recipients had a preference for a specific type of image, one that conformed (physiognomically) to prevalent images in Israel's consumer culture. We will now look at the making and the cultural-politics of this preference, which enhances social hierarchies through naturalization. This process is considered in the context of the objectification of 'nature'
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into commodified body images, to be accomplished and consumed. We will touch upon its implications for the erosion of hitherto unchallenged cosmological assumptions that took 'nature' for granted. Considering Strathern's emphasis on the anguish that procreative choice may entail, we suggest that in the Jewish Israeli context of DI, choice does not constitute a mere threat. On the one hand, the crisis depicted by Strathern applies for Israelis, including DI recipients. On the other hand, on a different level, from our data it also emerges as an opportunity, as many recipients took advantage of the ability to select a socially attractive donor. Some social implications are at the level of familial gender hierarchy. On the one hand, in the context of DI, the male partner's shortcomings become highlighted. The man is the one whose macho image -so crucial in the Israeli culture -is threatened. Additionally, choice, as constituted in DI, renders him somewhat substitutable, devalued by a donor having a socially more desirable profile. For traditional men, the need to fulfill the biblical commandment 'Be fruitful and multiply' (accomplished only when he has fathered at least one boy and one girl) presents an additional challenge to or reminder of their impairment, here constructed as a failure. On the other hand, the woman -who, in the Jewish tradition is the carrier of the infertility stigma -is partially relieved from the stigma and empowered by the possibility of image consumption, which grants her an unprecedented option to influence the future of her offspring through modifying their appearance. Unlike the men, women's connection to the pregnancy and future child is not challenged by this option. (The availability of the service for single women further underscores this newly constituted general balance of power between the genders.) However, this reproductive modification remained within the limits of the 'natural' model. The choices of Jewish Israeli married recipients apparently adhere to the 'natural family' model as the paradigm that sets the limits of the deviations that are considered reasonable and acceptable within their own families. Another interpretation of these self-imposed restrictions may read them as a modified version of male domination. Indeed, the continuity that predominates in social arrangements, including gender and ethnic/racial relations, as well as the assumptions regarding 'the natural' and 'the taken for granted,' all appear to be rooted in and enhance this paradigm. Nature, as kinship, is then not entirely lost. 12 On a wider scope, one may identify a certain regionalism in the popular donor image. The Israeli donor's image of choice is definitely not the Nordic type that dominates the international scene, but rather a Mediterranean character, which hints at a certain pluralism or regional autonomy. This partiality in the adoption of consumer-culture images (namely a 'localized' version of consumer images) accords with the mixed data provided by foreign studies on the narrowing/persistence of gaps between the physiognomic preferences of various ethnic and class categories (Akan and Grilo, 1995; Featherstone, 1991; Story et al., 1995) . Such regionalism may constitute a prime constituent of people's identity, an element that accords with the primordial status bestowed on the 'natural family'.
The emergence of a preference for a specific socio-physiognomic type in the private, as well as regional spheres of family image is, obviously, not spontaneous. First, the very sphere in which it occurs -i.e. the family sphere and the quest for parenthood -is itself not accidental. As mentioned earlier, the supreme importance bestowed in Israel on having a family and the social pressures to bear children under all circumstances cross all social boundaries. Hegemony, which is highly effective in this context, is transparent and beyond contestation. As such, this realm furnishes convenient ground for generalized communication, in which Jewish Israelis in all walks of life may take part. Moreover, participation is presumably on equal grounds because ordinary social demarcations are irrelevant here. As is often the case, hegemony is accomplished, 'not by the imposition of the monolithic ideology of one class on others, but by the grouping of ideologies and the construction of new relations between them, with the powerful groups leading all others rather than dominating' (Bennett, 1982: 15) . It is through exercising their own, presumably free will that recipients choose the same type of donor. They consider this option a privilege. Its general social effects go unnoticed.
The dominant ideology of the 'natural family', manifested as common sense and common knowledge, which constitutes the limits of recipients' choices of images, is derived from various historical sources. It stems from the reverberations of Jewish religion in the Israeli state, from the view of the state as responsible for the (Jewish) community (e.g. Swirski, 1976) . The community itself is defined in familial terms and the professionals, who deal with its biological reproduction, act as its agents.
However, the practice of DI in Israel is hegemonized by yet another ideology, that of the white Ashkenazi middle class. In our study, we saw the 'demand' and the 'supply' sides of the transaction. On the demand side, this hegemony is manifested in the consumers' choices and their view of the donor images as a basis for one's future status. Despite the Oriental image of Israeli exoticism, mostly that which is marketed to outsiders, our data suggest that at home, Israelis -both singles and married -prefer their children to have a more 'western', Ashkenazi look.
On the 'supply' side, the professionals' impact is salient. The professionals themselves were all educated Askenazi, thus belonging to the hegemonic social section and identified with its ideals and interests. Thus, their own proclivity for the same type of donor is important to note. One manifestation of their attitude is the relative socio-physiognomic homogeneity of the donors (Table 1) , which apparently fulfilled a crucial gatekeeping function. The donors that were presented to the recipients did not represent, as mentioned earlier, the diversity of Israel's Jewish population. The predominance of Ashkenazi donors, their features, and educational standing all directed the recipients toward one type of donor rather than others.
Later on, in the undisputedly discrete and isolated context of DI procedures, the professionals are the only ones who have actually met both parties (donor and recipients), and their comments are often the only ones heard by the recipients (Carmeli and Birenbaum-Carmeli, 1997) . As such, their responses and recommendations exert -so they in fact state -a singular impact on the recipients' consumer decisions. The health professionals, who generally share the same hegemonic ideas, promote the ruling classes' interests through 'impressing their definitions of the situation upon those they rule and . . . significantly limiting what is thought throughout society' (Gitlin, 1980: 10) .
The professionals' implicit preference of 'the Ashkenazi', which obviously was not stated anywhere and most likely not consciously intended, may be viewed as an interesting illustration of the 'sophistication and intensification of the means of regulations and surveillance, what some are beginning to call "governing by culture"' (Hall, 1997: 215) . In so doing, the professionals enhance the general tendency of dominant groups to generalize their own features into the hegemonic standard of beauty. The professionals, counting on their accumulated experienceboth as clinicians and as 'mature women' (quoted from the bank manager's depiction) -are confident that they know what a 'right' choice is . Their authoritative style of recommendation reflects this approach and is indeed often 'abided'.
Both the list presented to the recipients as well as their actual choices reflect a world of consumer-culture ideals. More specifically, for the Israeli case, these ideals are couched in the hegemonic discourse of Israeli Ashkenazi groups. Eventually, whether owing to the impact of the professionals or to that of mass culture, all parties seem eager to adopt these options and to operate according to them. In this respect, the convergence of professionals' and recipients' attitudes around the same ideal is a far-reaching illustration of self-regulation and governing by culture and how deeply major social institutions penetrate individuals' lives.
The choice of donor by DI recipients presents an extreme case in which people construct their family, even their wider social identities, by adhering to the rules of mass culture and social hegemony. Their choice of a donor, which is concealed from the external world but materializes in the form of a child, an intimate extension of themselves, of their private and social being, is carved by the ideals of mass consumption. x R U T H W E I S S E N B E R G is the Head of Laboratory, Andrology Unit, Sheba Medical Center, Tel-Hashomer, Ramat-Gan, Israel.
